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Abstract
This chapter begins with two fundamental questions: How should risk be allocated in
the face of signiﬁcant uncertainty—and who should decide? Its focus on public actors
reflects the signiﬁcant role that legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts will
play in answering these questions, whether through rules, investigations, verdicts, or
other forms of public regulation. The eight strategies discussed in this chapter would in
effect regulate that regulation. They seek to ensure that those who are injured can be
compensated (by expanding public insurance and facilitating private insurance), that
any prospective rules develop in tandem with the technologies to which they would
apply (by privileging the concrete and delegating the safety case), that reasonable
design choices receive sufﬁcient legal support (by limiting the duration of risk and
excluding the extreme), and that conventional driving is subject to as much scrutiny as
automated driving (by rejecting the status quo and embracing enterprise liability).
27.1 Introduction
27.1.1 In Context
Two complex and conflicting objectives shape altruistic regulation of human activity:
maximizing net social good and mitigating incidental individual loss. Eminent domain
provides a superﬁcially simple example: To build a road that beneﬁts ten thousand people,
a government evicts—and compensates—the ten people whose homes are in the way. But
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in many cases, individual loss is not fully compensable, most strikingly when that loss
involves death: Whatever her actual detriment, a person who dies cannot be “made
whole.” And indeed, more than 30,000 people lose their lives on US roadways every year
while more than 300 million obtain some direct or indirect beneﬁt from motorized
transport.
The promise that vehicle automation holds for highway safety raises difﬁcult questions
about regulation’s social and individual objectives. Analyzing either objective requires
topical and temporal deﬁnition of a manageable system in which costs and beneﬁts can be
identiﬁed, valued, and compared. With respect to net social good, what is the statistical
value of a human life? Is a reduction in organ donations a “cost” of safer highways? Could
aggressive deployment of particular technologies cause a backlash that ultimately
undermines safety? Similarly, with respect to individual loss, how should injury or death
be valued? Should culpability affect compensation? Who is entitled to it? The particular
answers to these questions may depend on the domain—law, economics, ethics, the social
sciences—from which they are drawn.
Vehicle automation exposes tension between the social and individual objectives.
Externalities frequently accompany innovation: Inventors impose costs that they need not
or cannot bear and create beneﬁts that they cannot capture. Compensation of incidental
injury may be one such cost, and socially desirable innovations like automation might be
subsidized by shielding them from it. Calibrating net social good and individual loss can
also create moral hazard: Safety might be discounted by innovators who are legally or
effectively exempt from rules and immunized from lawsuits or by consumers who are
assured of compensation for injury.
This tension exists against two related background conditions. The ﬁrst is a preference
for the status quo—a tendency that is reflected in administrative law, in tort law, and
internationally in the precautionary principle. Many vehicle fatalities appear only in local
obituaries, but a single automated vehicle fatality would end up on national front pages.
The second is a failure by imperfectly probabilistic humans to accurately perceive risk.
Drivers who speed around blind corners but fear traveling over bridges demonstrate this
tendency to underestimate some risks and overestimate others.
This complex regulatory context leads to two fundamental questions: How should risk
be allocated in the face of signiﬁcant uncertainty—and who should decide? The range of
actors includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of national and subnational
governments, companies, standards organizations, consumers, and the public at large.
Regulation can be prospective or retrospective, but it cannot be nonexistent: Adminis-
trative agencies that decline to establish safety requirements for automated vehicles
merely leave this task to judges and juries after incidents have occurred.
The consequences of action or inaction are as stark as they are uncertain. Regulatory
acts or omissions could cost lives in the near term by delaying or raising the price of
automation technologies [1]. But they could also save lives in the longer term by pro-
tecting broad classes of innovation from the potential reputational damage that early
tragedies or controversies could inflict. Charting the currents of abstract social gain and
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concrete human loss from vehicle automation requires appreciating the risks that regu-
lation presents as well as those that it addresses.
This chapter ﬁrst considers the nature of risk, the nature of regulation, and the chal-
lenge of regulating—in a broad sense—the increasing automation of motor vehicles. It
then introduces four pairs of potential strategies to respond to this challenge, as sum-
marized in Table 27.1.
These strategies are not exhaustive. They may be unnecessary. And they may be
insufﬁcient. Some are obvious, some are unconventional, and some may well be both.
Their purpose is to advance discussion of the proper role of the public sector—legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and courts—in addressing automation’s challenges and
opportunities.
27.1.2 What Is Risk?
Risk can mean so many things that, without context, it means not much at all. Broadly,
“[t]he risk of a particular harm is the product of the probability of that harm and the
severity of that harm; the risk of an act or omission is the sum of the risks of the particular
associated harms” [2]. This actual risk, however, is merely theoretical: No actor can
comprehensively inventory all associated harms or accurately determine their probabilities
and magnitudes.
In practice, actual risk is therefore simpliﬁed into assessed and perceived risk. Assessed
risk reflects a methodical attempt to objectively describe all signiﬁcant harms within a
deﬁned system; this system might contemplate a broad range of harms, as in the case of an
environmental impact statement, or a more narrow range, as in the case of a functional
safety standard focused on physical injury to humans [2]. In contrast, perceived risk
reflects an individual’s subjective judgment about particular dangers; it may differ con-
siderably from the assessed risk.
An internalized risk is one that is borne by the actor who creates it, regardless of
whether that actor has correctly assessed or perceived that risk. Internalization is central to
Table 27.1 Potential regulatory strategies
Ensure sufﬁcient compensation for those who are injured
Expand public insurance Facilitate private insurance
Force information-sharing by the private sector to enhance regulation
Privilege the concrete Delegate the safety case
Simplify both the technical and the regulatory challenges in coordination
Limit the duration of risk Exclude the extreme
Raise the playing ﬁeld for conventional actors along with automated systems
Reject the status quo Embrace enterprise liability
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tort law’s regulatory role: By forcing actors to bear more of the costs of their unreasonably
dangerous behavior, tort law seeks to deter that behavior.
The ﬁnancial risks imposed on these actors, however, are categorically different from
the physical risks that these actors impose on others. In obligating these actors to pay
damages to those they have injured, tort law also plays a compensatory role. Nonetheless,
even if those who are injured succeed in recovering damages, they will still have been
injured [2].
Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between reducing physical risk (a regulatory
function) and shifting ﬁnancial risk (a compensatory function). Some of the regulatory
strategies introduced below may achieve one of these two objectives at the expense of the
other.
27.1.3 What Is Regulation?
Regulation checks and changes behavior. In its narrowest sense, the term refers only to
rules enacted by an administrative agency. A more useful conception, however, encom-
passes a broad range of actions, including those illustrated in Fig. 27.1 [3].
Regulation can be prospective (forward-looking) or retrospective (backward-looking).
Prospective actions, shown on the left side, contemplate a generalized risk that has not
manifested, as in the case of the federal performance requirements governing vehicle
design. In contrast, retrospective actions, shown on the right side, respond to the real-
ization of a risk, as in the case of a tort claim by a person injured in a crash. The possibility
of retrospective regulation, particularly if it is foreseeable, can affect behavior even if the
risk is never realized.
Regulation can also be pursued by a public actor or by a private actor. Public actions,
shown on the top, include typical functions of the state: setting requirements and con-
ducting investigations. In contrast, private actions, shown on the bottom, generally
Fig. 27.1 Quadrants of regulation
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involve relationships among private parties: a consensus among market participants, a
contract between an insurer and its insured, or the tort duties of a manufacturer to those
who are injured by its products.
Although this chapter focuses on public actors, these private relationships remain an
important tool of public policy. A statutory requirement that drivers obtain sufﬁcient
insurance, for example, delegates some regulatory power to the private-sector insurance
companies that then decide, subject to additional public regulation, how much any par-
ticular driver should be charged.
27.1.4 The Regulatory Challenge
For public regulators, the utilitarian challenge is to indirectly maximize net social good
while indirectly mitigating incidental individual loss. With respect to vehicle automation,
this means deﬁning an appropriate system in which societal costs and beneﬁts can be
analyzed [2], checking that the incentives and disincentives for developers of automated
systems are consistent with that system, reconciling these with the incentives and disin-
centives for other actors, and ensuring that those who are harmed have appropriate access
to some means of compensation.
This chapter outlines four pairs of potential regulatory strategies that could advance
these goals. Its focus on risk management by public actors complements earlier risk
management proposals for private actors [4]. These strategies involve ensuring compen-
sation by expanding public insurance and facilitating private insurance, forcing
information-sharing by privileging the concrete and delegating the safety case, simplifying
the problem by limiting the duration of risk and excluding the extreme, and raising the
playing ﬁeld by rejecting the status quo and embracing enterprise liability.
27.2 Ensure Compensation
27.2.1 Expand Public Insurance
Insurance can help reduce the ﬁnancial burden placed on injured individuals and,
potentially, the compensatory pressure placed on tort law. Ensuring that those who are
physically injured by automated vehicles are able to recover for their injuries makes the
occurrence of those injuries, at least from a public policy perspective, more justiﬁable. If
the only avenue for that recovery, however, is litigation, product liability law may be
forced to bend in ways that distort its regulatory function.
While an expansion of insurance has merit as a standalone initiative, it must be a
condition of any reasonable proposal to subsidize vehicle automation by limiting tort
remedies. Reducing a defendant’s liability means reducing an injured individual’s access
to compensation. It also means depriving that individual of a sanctioned means of
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recourse: Suing a manufacturer, whatever its inefﬁciencies, is still preferable to sabotaging
that company’s products or undertaking other means of private retribution.
27.2.2 Facilitate Private Insurance
While private insurers can also provide compensation, their potential role as regulators is
particularly promising. A well-functioning insurance market can generate useful data and
desirable incentives. It can reduce uncertainty for those who might be plaintiffs as well as
for those who are regularly defendants. Take two distinct examples: vehicle insurance and
product liability insurance.
In the United States, most drivers and vehicle owners are required to carry insurance for
harms inflicted with their vehicles. The required coverage varies by state and is generally
far less than would be necessary to compensate for a serious injury or death; California, for
example, requires only $15,000 in coverage for injury or death to one person and $30,000
in coverage for injury or death to more than one person [5]. The companies that offer this
insurance tend to be subject to complex regulatory regimes that also vary by state; Cali-
fornia even prescribes the primary factors to be used in pricing such insurance [6].
An alternative regime could respond much more flexibly to vehicle automation.
Increasing and then enforcing insurance requirements could help internalize more crash
costs, compensate injury more fully, shift some recovery from manufacturers toward
negligent drivers, and enable consolidation of some product liability claims through
subrogation. Reducing consumer-facing restrictions on insurers could free these compa-
nies to better tailor their products to reflect the actual risk posed by particular drivers in
particular vehicles in particular conditions. This could in turn advantage those automated
vehicles that actually represent a safety improvement.
In contrast to drivers, companies are generally not required by law to maintain product
liability insurance. Indeed, one of the purposes of the corporate form is to protect
shareholders from liability. Requiring such coverage, however, could provide a check on
safety by engaging a third-party insurer in a regulatory role: In order to obtain affordable
coverage—or coverage at all—a manufacturer would need to persuade the insurer that its
products do not pose unreasonable risk. This would be another way to “delegate the safety
case,” to quote the section of the same name below.
The regimes created by Nevada and California to regulate automated vehicles already
require companies seeking to test their systems on public roads to demonstrate ﬁnancial
capacity beyond typical state insurance requirements. California, for example, requires
$5,000,000 in the form of a certiﬁcate of insurance, a certiﬁcate of self-insurance, or a
surety bond [7]. While this approach is promising, these heightened insurance require-
ments should apply to all vehicles rather than merely to automated vehicles undergoing
testing. As the section of the same name argues below, such regulation should “raise the
playing ﬁeld” for conventional as well as automated vehicles.
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27.3 Force Information-Sharing
27.3.1 Privilege the Concrete
Product development requires understanding, and as necessary shaping, external forces
like law. If speciﬁc legal obligations, restrictions, or liabilities are impeding automated
vehicle technologies, then would-be developers of those technologies should challenge
those constraints. In short, they should identify the speciﬁc legal changes that they or their
products require—and support these arguments with concrete data and careful analysis. If
they do not, policymakers should ask why.
Although concerns have been raised for decades about the product liability implications
of increasing vehicle automation [8], automakers tend to refer only broadly, if at all, to this
potential challenge even as they announce plans to deploy increasingly advanced
automation features. This apparent disconnect suggests either that the technologies them-
selves are not as imminent as popularly believed [9] or that the companies pursuing those
technologies are not as concerned about general product liability as is commonly suggested.
In contrast, automakers have acted to address a more narrow liability question related
to the installation or modiﬁcation of automation systems. Several state legislatures have
now clariﬁed that, to quote Michigan law [10], manufacturers and subcomponent pro-
ducers are “not liable and shall be dismissed from any action for alleged damages resulting
from” such third-party installations or conversions “unless the defect from which the
damages resulted was present” at the time of manufacture. This provision is largely a
restatement of common law [9] and, like common law, does not unambiguously con-
template every potential modiﬁcation claim.1
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, this experience demonstrates that established
automakers can recognize potential legal issues, propose speciﬁc legislative remedies, and
—with the exception of California [11]—obtain their enactment. To the extent that
automated vehicles depend on changes to vehicle codes [12], insurance requirements, or
rules of liability, regulators should expect well-reasoned and well-supported arguments
from their high-proﬁle developers.
Relying exclusively on companies to advance speciﬁc legal changes, however, can
tend to preserve the status quo. Unlike conventional cars, low-speed shuttles and delivery
robots generally have neither existing markets nor established companies to advocate for
them. As a result, these applications of automation have been largely ignored in recent
legislative and regulatory initiatives [9]. Accordingly, governments should also consider
whether a dearth of speciﬁc proposals or concrete data can be explained by an inability
rather than a disinclination to participate in the regulatory process.
1Consider two examples. In the ﬁrst, the manufacturer fails to warn against a foreseeable
modiﬁcation of its vehicle; might that failure to warn constitute a “defect from which the damages
resulted”? In the second, the subcomponent producer designs a sensor that is highly vulnerable to
hacking; might that security vulnerability constitute a “defect from which the damages resulted”?
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In a sense, governments should approach policymaking with the same philosophy
underlying public support of physical infrastructure and scientiﬁc research: Initiate what
the private sector cannot or will not do. Broad mandates or basic conditions may be useful
in driving or policing innovation, but attempts to closely tailor rules to products that do
not yet exist could produce law that is premature and prejudicial.
27.3.2 Delegate the Safety Case
Vehicle automation is putting state regulators in a difﬁcult position. Prominent examples
come from Nevada and California, the two states whose departments of motor vehicles
were directed to quickly enact regulations governing automated vehicles and automated
driving.2 These regulations seek both to provide greater legal certainty to the developers
of automated systems [13–15] and to restrict unreasonably dangerous products and
practices [16].
Many states, however, already empower regulators to restrict the registration, modi-
ﬁcation, or operation of road vehicles on the basis of safety [12]. A New York statute, for
example, permits the motor vehicle commissioner to “refuse to register any vehicle or
class of vehicles for use on the public highways where he determines that the charac-
teristics of such vehicle or class of vehicles make such vehicle or vehicles unsafe for
highway operation” [17].
Alternative approaches to deploying automation systems, including pilot projects and
aftermarket modiﬁcations, may implicate this authority more quickly than would tradi-
tional rollouts [9]. Long before the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration
(NHTSA) promulgates rules for automated vehicles3 or even conducts investigations into
incidents involving them, state regulators may be facing—or at least actively ignoring—
the question of whether to revoke the registration of a vehicle retroﬁtted with a novel
automation system.
Answering such a question will inevitably frustrate these regulators [15]. There is no
consensus about how to deﬁne, or then how to demonstrate, the appropriate level of safety
for an automated vehicle or for the human-machine system to which it may belong [18].
Moreover, the kind of regulation that is appropriate for an established automaker may
differ considerably from the kind that is appropriate for a small startup or an individual
tinkerer [9].
Although state vehicle agencies generally lack NHTSA’s technical resources, they may
have more regulatory flexibility. Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) are
2Other states have enacted automated driving statutes without expressly requiring this rulemaking.
3NHTSA has historically promulgated performance standards only for safety technologies that have
already been widely deployed, although the eventual regulation of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications systems is likely to be an exception.
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restricted to objective measures and to tests “capable of producing identical results when
test conditions are exactly duplicated” [19], quoted in [20].
In contrast, state agencies may be bound by less demanding requirements of admin-
istrative process, which may afford them the discretion needed to gradually develop
consistent practice. Such flexibility could enable regulators to address speciﬁc technolo-
gies without entrenching rules that are likely to become anachronistic and irreconcilable
with others.
To this end, “delegating the safety case” would mean requiring the developer of a
vehicle automation system to publicly make and defend arguments about how well its
system should perform and how well its system actually performs. In short:
1. A manufacturer documents its actual and planned product design, testing, and
monitoring.
2. The manufacturer publicly presents this documentation in the form of a safety case.
3. The regulatory agency and interested parties comment on this safety case.
4. The manufacturer publicly addresses these comments.
5. The agency determines that the manufacturer has presented a reasonable safety case.
6. The manufacturer certiﬁes that its product adheres to its safety case.
7. The manufacturer sells that product.
This process draws on several existing models, including the type approval (or
homologation) typical in the European Union and the self-certiﬁcation prescribed by US
law. It could accommodate the kind of process standards used in ISO 26262, the kind of
alternatives discussion characteristic of environmental impact statements, and the kind of
public dialogue foundational to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
By encouraging companies to disclose information necessary to their safety case, such
an approach could help educate regulators and the broader public about the capabilities
and limitations of these emerging technologies. Although disclosure could justiﬁably
concern some developers, this process would not require the disclosure of all information,
only that which is necessary to demonstrate a reasonable safety case. What is reasonable
will likely evolve, and this approach could afford companies greater flexibility to make
nontraditional arguments for the safety of their systems and regulators greater flexibility to
adapt to changing capabilities.
Because flexibility can alsomean uncertainty, early collaboration between regulators and
developers may be necessary to avoid all-or-nothing approval decisions at the end of
product development. Regardless, uncertainty is not a new concern: Whatever clarity that
the current federal regime offers through self-certiﬁcation to speciﬁc standards is diminished
by the recalls and lawsuits that can arise years or even decades after a vehicle has been sold.
Indeed, unlike current federal motor vehicle safety standards, a safety case could
contemplate the entire product lifecycle. A developer might describe not only the steps it
had taken to ensure reasonable safety at the time of sale but also the steps it would
continue to take as it learned more about performance in the ﬁeld.
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27.4 Simplify the Problem
27.4.1 Limit the Duration of Risk
The potential longevity of any motor vehicle—the “average” age of cars in the United
States is more than eleven years [21]—can create uncertainty for its manufacturers [4] and
safety concerns for the public [14]. In 2013, Chrysler reluctantly recalled some Jeeps that
were twenty years old [22, 23]. More generally, newer vehicles tend to be safer than older
vehicles; “improvements made after the model year 2000 fleet prevented the crashes of
700,000 vehicles; prevented or mitigated the injuries of 1 million occupants; and saved
2000 lives in the 2008 calendar year alone” [24].
This uncertainty may be particularly great in the case of automated vehicles [4]. Even
extensive testing may not capture the full range of scenarios that these vehicles could face.
Manufacturers may have difﬁculty predicting “the eventual response of judges, juries,
regulators, consumers, and the public at large to incidents that will inevitably occur” [1].
Regulators may be “concerned that, ﬁrst, isolated incidents involving these products will
create feelings of helplessness and panic that unjustiﬁably stymie their wider adoption and
that, second, these early products will still be around years later when they are much less
safe than whatever has become state of the art” [14].
A promising response to these challenges is a lifecycle approach to vehicle design that
seeks to limit the duration of risk. For the private sector, this could entail over-the-air
updates, end-user license agreements, leasing arrangements, and a variety of other tech-
nical and legal tools to enable manufacturers to update or even forcibly retire systems in
which they no longer have conﬁdence [4]. For the public sector, this could mean requiring
companies to document a strategy and a capacity for monitoring the long-term safety of
their systems. Such documentation could be a key part of the safety case introduced
above.
27.4.2 Exclude the Extreme
The aphorism that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” [25] is instructive for vehicle
automation. Demanding perfection may impede the development or deployment of sys-
tems that, while not perfect, nonetheless represent a signiﬁcant improvement over con-
ventional vehicles. Excessive design demands, for example, might preclude an automated
vehicle that could avoid many of the common errors of human drivers but that could not
avoid catastrophic multicar freeway pileups to the extent physically possible. In other
words, it may be prudent to accept some failures in order to expedite larger successes.
Moreover, attempting to design an automated vehicle to handle every conceivable
driving scenario may introduce complexity that is poorly understood, unmanageable, and
ultimately detrimental to safety. Again, for example, designing an automated vehicle to
rapidly accelerate through a pileup-in-progress might lead to programming oversights that
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could cause that same vehicle to errantly speed up after entering a closed construction
zone. Here it may be prudent to accept some failures in order to prevent even more
catastrophic failures.
For both of these reasons, early generations of automated vehicles may necessarily
limit the technical challenges that they attempt to solve. These vehicles might be deployed
into simpliﬁed environments at lower speeds [9]. Or they might continue to rely in part on
human drivers [26], particularly if those humans are professionals who can be carefully
trained, closely monitored, and sufﬁciently incentivized.
Sound engineering may demand additional limitations. For example, it may be prudent
to program an automated vehicle to never speed, to always slow to a stop in the event of a
detected failure, or to always permit human override within a set number of seconds.
These stylized examples might mean that, in occasional cases, an automated vehicle will
crash because it has failed to accelerate or because it has stopped or because its human
driver has made poor decisions while panicking.
Although these should be primarily technical determinations, law may be able to play a
supporting role. In some jurisdictions, for example, the plaintiff in a product liability case
must demonstrate that an alternative product design was available and superior to the one
alleged to have contributed to her injury. In such a case, it may be appropriate to give
more weight to counterarguments about the complexity, uncertainty, and delay inherent in
such designs.
There are, however, two important cautions. First, for those injuries that do occur, this
strategy merely shifts more of the risk to those people who have been injured. This
consequence highlights the need for a sufﬁcient social safety net, whether provided
through public insurance, private insurance, or another means. Second, codifying a ceiling
on the performance required could mean calcifying the level of reasonable design for
technologies that may quickly be capable of much more.
27.5 Raise the Playing Field
27.5.1 Reject the Status Quo
The reality that human drivers often violate rules of the road prompts speculation that
programming automated vehicles to comply with these rules would reduce their appeal.
Suggestions for addressing this perceived disadvantage have included expressly permit-
ting automated vehicles to travel at or above the prevailing trafﬁc speed and delegating
decisions about speed or aggression to the human users of these vehicles.
Drivers, however, currently behave in ways that are neither lawful nor reasonable [2].
They drive too fast for conditions, they follow other vehicles too closely, and they fail to
yield the right of way to pedestrians. They drive while intoxicated or distracted. They fail
to properly maintain their vehicles’ tires, brakes, and lights. These largely unlawful
behaviors occasionally result in crashes, and those crashes occasionally result in serious
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injury. This tragic status quo suggests that the current approach to trafﬁc enforcement
should be reformed rather than transferred to automated vehicles.
At this early stage in automation, transportation authorities would do better to optimize
and then enforce rules of the road for all motor vehicles. Increasing the expectations
placed on human drivers—by cracking down on speeding, texting, drunk driving, and
other dangerous activities—could increase the appeal of automated vehicles at least as
much as allowing those automated vehicles to speed.
Automated enforcement could be a key tool for increasing compliance. Such
enforcement currently relies both on roadway devices (including speed and red light
cameras) and on in-vehicle devices (including alcohol locks, speed regulators, and pro-
prietary data recorders). Private entities such as fleet managers and insurance companies
already provide some of this enforcement indirectly through private incentives. The
potential proliferation of outward-facing cameras on vehicles and drones in the air might
also facilitate increased public and private enforcement of rules of the road.
Increased enforcement could, on one hand, address equity concerns of discretionary
enforcement and, on the other hand, raise privacy and liberty concerns. While these are
important questions, a status quo in which laws are openly flouted even by the ofﬁcers
enforcing them is one that begs for reform.
Indeed, more consistent and comprehensive enforcement could create pressure for a
careful evaluation of existing law. Better access to and analysis of location-speciﬁc
information about the driving environment (including roadway geometry, pavement,
trafﬁc, and weather) could enable the precise calibration of dynamic speed limits. These
dynamic limits might then be communicated to drivers through variable message signs
and, in the future, vehicle-to-infrastructure communication.
Because reasonable speed also depends on the driver and her vehicle, posted limits
might nonetheless have only limited utility. Pursuant to the basic speed law [2], a human
driver should account for each of these variables implicitly and adjust her speed
accordingly. Automated vehicles, however, may account for more of these variables
explicitly—and reasonably.
Consider, for example, the common requirement that the “driver of a vehicle shall yield
the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or…
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, except as otherwise provided” [27]. Although
pedestrians may not create an “immediate hazard” by “suddenly” leaving the curb [27],
the statutory obligation to yield does suggest one possible bound on vehicle speed.
Imagine a driver traveling down a typical neighborhood street with a parking lane that
provides 3 m between her car and the curb, as shown in Fig. 27.2. Assuming that her view
of the pedestrian is not blocked, what maximum speed will enable this driver to stop for
any pedestrian who, at a walking speed of 1.4 m/s, steps from the curb into the street?
Although stopping sight distance depends on several vehicle, environment, and driver
variables [28], this illustration simpliﬁes these to consider only the driver’s reaction time
and the friction between the tires and the road surface. An average driver with good tires
on a flat dry street might achieve a reaction time of 1 s and a subsequent deceleration rate
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of 5 m/s2, which implies a maximum speed of 20 km/h (13 mph).4 In contrast, a hypo-
thetical automated vehicle reacting twice as fast and braking at 7 m/s2 could reach a
maximum speed of about 40 km/h (25 mph),5 which is a typical residential speed limit
today. In other words, if automated vehicles are traveling slowly on a road, perhaps
conventional vehicles should be traveling even more slowly.
Reasonable speed is also an answer to some, though not all, of the ethical dilemmas
popularly raised in the context of automated driving [29, 30]. Positing a choice between
killing one group of pedestrians and another, for example, fails to account for the pos-
sibility of negating the dilemma simply by driving more slowly. Slower speeds can
increase controllability as well as reduce the magnitude of harm.
Speed is not the only relevant driver action. Tire condition, for example, is an
important consideration in stopping distance, is at least nominally regulated [31], and yet
varies widely within the current vehicle fleet. If the hardware on automated vehicles is
expected to be regularly inspected, so too should the hardware on conventional vehicles.
Moreover, driving imposes environmental costs that are not internalized by vehicle
owners and operators [32]. If automated driving proves to be more fuel efﬁcient than
human driving, a higher fuel tax would also incentivize automation.
In short, reform should seek to more closely align what is lawful with what is rea-
sonable and to more closely align actual driver behavior with both [2]. The expectation
that both automated vehicles and human drivers should behave reasonably is itself rea-
sonable and ultimately advantageous to automated driving.
Fig. 27.2 Illustration of vehicle stopping
4Initial speed = rate of deceleration * ((pedestrian speed/orthogonal distance from curb to
car) − reaction time) = (0.5 * 9.8 m/s2) * (((1.4 m/s)/3 m) − 1 s) = 6 m/s = 20 km/h = 13 mph.
5Initial speed = rate of deceleration * ((pedestrian speed/orthogonal distance from curb to car) − re-
action time) = (0.7 * 9.8 m/s2) * (((1.4 m/s)/3 m) − 0.5 s) = 11 m/s = 41 km/h = 25 mph.
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27.5.2 Embrace Enterprise Liability
Although vehicle automation will change the way some cases are litigated and resolved,
manufacturers are likely to continue to successfully manage their product liability [1].
Uncertainty about liability is probably more of an impediment to product deployment than
actual exposure to liability—and there are strategies that companies can take to manage
that uncertainty [4].
This conﬁdence, however, is not universal [33]. A more skeptical view even has
precedent: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 was passed in response to
similar concerns that traditional product liability had rendered some vaccines uneconomic
for their would-be producers. The regime it created “combines procedural and substantive
limitations on conventional tort remedies with an alternative compensation scheme for
probable victims of covered vaccines” [4].
If product liability exposure does impede the deployment of automated vehicles, a
similar regime might be an effective response. However, that is by no means the only
conceivable alternative.
Rather than limiting liability for the manufacturers of automated systems, courts or
legislatures could expand liability for everyone else. This is counterintuitive and, as a
legislative proposal, unlikely to go anywhere. Nonetheless, consider the consequences of
introducing a system of enterprise liability in which manufacturers are liable for all harm
associated with their products. In other words, what would be different if automakers
could be successfully sued for every crash involving their product rather than just the
small fraction in which a vehicle defect contributed to the injury?
Some effects would be undesirable. Automakers might outright refuse to sell their
vehicles in any jurisdiction with enterprise liability. Others would demand higher prices to
cover their increased costs. This could in turn mean less access for consumers, particularly
those with limited resources.
Other effects, however, might arguably be more desirable. No longer would dealers
simply hand over car keys to new buyers. Instead, manufacturers might require these
buyers to complete more thorough driver training customized for the particular vehicle.
Technologies like alcohol-sensing ignition locks and speed regulators might become
standard. Older vehicles might be promptly removed from roads as safer systems are
introduced. A notable result could be safer roads.
Another result could be greater automation: Given the choice between paying for the
mistakes of their own technologies and paying for the mistakes of their disparate cus-
tomers, many companies would likely opt for their technology. Automation would
become a solution to rather than merely a source of litigation.
Even if pure enterprise liability remains a thought experiment, its principles are evident
in other areas relevant to automation. Fleet operators are an attractive market for auto-
mated vehicles in part because they are already liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of their drivers. Automation may also offer near-term ﬁnancial or market advantages to
insurers, which similarly pay for injuries caused by their insured.
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More broadly, as manufacturers gain and assert more control over the products they
have sold through technology and contract, they may also incur greater legal obligations
in tort [4]. These obligations, which might approach enterprise liability without actually
reaching it, could have a similar effect on design decisions. Eventually, selling a vehicle
that lacks safety-critical automation features might itself be unreasonable.
27.6 Conclusion
This chapter began with two fundamental questions: How should risk be allocated in the
face of signiﬁcant uncertainty—and who should decide? Its focus on public actors reflects
the signiﬁcant role that legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts will play in
answering these questions, whether through rules, investigations, verdicts, or other forms
of public regulation.
The eight strategies discussed above would in effect regulate that regulation. They seek
to ensure that those who are injured can be compensated, that any prospective rules
develop in tandem with the technologies to which they would apply, that reasonable
design choices receive sufﬁcient legal support, and that conventional driving is subject to
as much scrutiny as automated driving. Table 27.2 summarizes.
This focus on public actors does not diminish the important roles that private actors
play in innovation and in regulation. Indeed, several of the strategies discussed above
expressly embrace these roles. In this spirit, a challenge for—and to—developers of
automated systems is to contribute fully and publicly to the broader discussions for which
these strategies are intended.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplication,
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Table 27.2 Potential regulatory strategies
Ensure sufﬁcient compensation for those who are injured
Expand public insurance Facilitate private insurance
Force information-sharing by the private sector to enhance regulation
Privilege the concrete Delegate the safety case
Simplify both the technical and the regulatory challenges in coordination
Limit the duration of risk Exclude the extreme
Raise the playing ﬁeld for conventional actors along with automated systems
Reject the status quo Embrace enterprise liability
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